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The Americans with Disabilities Act,
Its Antecedents, and Its Impact
on Law Enforcement Employment
Martin Schiff
I. INTRODUCTION
The American With Disabilities Act (ADA),' signed into law on July 26,
1990, is the most significant legislation ever enacted to prevent discrimination
against disabled Americans. The scope of the legislation is sweeping,
encompassing employment (Title I), public services by state and local
governments including transportation (Title II), all public accommodations
(Title III), and all telecommunications (Title IV).2 The law, in essence,
recognizes the responsibility of the federal government to see to it that
* J.D. 1979, Fordham University School of Law; Ph.D. in political science 1969,
Rutgers University; Fulbright Fellow 1964-65, University of Stockholm (Sweden);
M.S. in educational administration and supervision 1977, Pace University; B.A. 1962,
City College of New York. Deputy Managing Attorney, Legal Bureau of the New
York City Police Department; Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice. Mr. Schiff has published numerous articles in the fields of law,
political science, and the social sciences.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the New York City Police Department, its Legal Bureau, or the City of New
York.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (Supp. III 1991)).
2. Title H of ADA applies to all activities of public entities, including their
employment practices. The Department of Justice, which has promulgated rules
implementing Title II, did not promulgate its own rules regarding the employment
practice of public entities but instead cross-referenced the regulation implementing
Title I of the ADA issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1992). As a consequence, public entities have been required to
comply with Title I employment rules since the effective date of Title H-January 26,
1992. The ADA also contains a miscellaneous provision (Title V, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12201-12213 (Supp. III 1991)), which in general depicts the ADA's relationship
to other laws (§ 12201(b)), explains insurance issues (§ 12201(c)), prohibits state
immunity (§ 12202), provides Congressional inclusion (§ 12209), sets regulations by
the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB) (§ 12204),
explains the implementation of each Title (§ 12206), and notes amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (§ 12201(a)).
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disabled Americans are fully integrated into all aspects of American life rather
than being deemed unfit merely because of their disability.
For the law enforcement community, however, particularly with respect
to the employment provisions of Titles I and II, the ADA poses a severe
challenge yet unmet. Under the ADA, it is no longer legal for an employer
of twenty-five or more individuals (reduced to fifteen on July 26, 1994)' to
discriminate against an "otherwise qualified" individual on the basis of a
physical or mental disability.4 The "otherwise qualified" standard assumes
that the qualifications for the job are readily measurable and ascertainable as
"job related" and "consistent with business necessity."' Such qualifications
are intended to be measured by criteria that are necessary for and substantially
related to an employee's ability to perform the essential functions of the job.6
The law enforcement community, however, because of its unique
character as the essential bedrock of society's law and order, has traditionally
been held to a higher standard of fitness and character than ordinary
employers.7 Thus, serious philosophical questions arise with respect to the
ADA's employment standards and whether such standards should be deemed
appropriate for law enforcement employers. The law enforcement community,
because of past challenges to its job criteria, especially alleged sex discrimina-
3. Title I of the Act defines an employer as one who has 15 or more employees
"except that, for two years following the effective date of this subchapter, an employer
means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding year, and any agent of such person." § 101 (5)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991). Thus, since the subchapter took effect on July 26,
1992, the application of the Act to employers of 15 or more employees takes effect on
July 26, 1994.
Title II of the Act, which prohibits discrimination by government agencies in any
activity, including employment practices, took effect 18 months after enactment, on
January 26, 1992. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 note (Supp. III 1991).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
5. Id § 12112 (b)(6).
6. Id. § 12113 (a).
7. See, e.g., Faure v. Chesworth, 489 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) The
court upheld the dismissal of a state trooper for improper use of a gun on three
occasions, noting that a higher standard of fitness and character pertains to police
officers than to ordinary civil servants. Id. at 642-43. See also Shedlock v. Connelie,
414 N.Y.S.2d 55 (App. Div. 1979), arf'd, 401 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 1979) (The court
upheld the disqualification of a state trooper for lack of fitness and good moral
character, observing, "[it has long been recognized that, due to the nature of the police
function in society, higher standards of fitness and character pertain to police officers
than to ordinary civil service employees." Id. at 56.)
[Vol. 58
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tion concerning physical standards,8 cannot presently come forth with job
8. See, e.g., United States v. City of Wichita Falls, 704 F.Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex.
1988) wherein female police applicants for the city police department alleged that the
physical agility tests used to determine eligibility disproportionately impacted on and
discriminated against female applicants. The case was ultimately settled by a consent
decree which, among others, prohibited the city of Wichita Falls from using a physical
agility test as a screening device for applicants that "operate[d] disproportionately to
disqualify female applicants if it [the test] [was] not... shown to be an operational
necessity for the position of Police Officer or to be a valid predictor of job perfor-
mance as defined in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1607." Id at 710. The effect of the
case and the consent decree was a lowered physical agility standard.
In New York City, the Police Department had maintained, until 1973, a two-
tiered appointment and assignment system for police officers with lower physical
standards and less dangerous matron duties (i.e., guarding female prisoners) for
policewomen. One consequence of this two-tiered system, however, was limited career
advancement possibilities for policewoman. Under attack for sex discrimination, the
N.Y.C. Police Department, in January 1973, merged the titles of Patrolman and
Policewoman into the title of Police Officer with a single examination for men and
women. This merger was designed to bring the N.Y.C. Police Department into
compliance with the Civil Rights Act, as amended, effective March 24, 1972.
However, the physical standards for female police officers had to be "normed," that
is adjusted for the lesser physical capacities for females generally in order to prevent
an adverse impact on female hiring.
When New York City experienced its fiscal crisis in 1975 and police layoffs were
implemented, female police officers having less seniority were disproportionately laid
off. The layoffs resulted in a successful sex discrimination case challengingthe layoffs
on the basis of discriminatory intent in creation of the seniority system and adverse
impact. See Acha v. Beame, 401 F.Supp. 816, 817 (S.D. N.Y. 1975), reversed, 531
F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976), on remand, 438 F.Supp. 70 (S.D. N.Y. 1977), aftd, 570 F.2d
57 (2d Cir. 1978). No attention at all was paid in the case to the female police
officers'lesser seniority and general inability to perform the physical standards of the
job as well as the men they were seeking to replace.
In current litigation against the New York City Police Department before the
N.Y.C. Commission on Human Rights (Powers v. Beame, etal., Complaint Nos. 7814-
EG-7887-EG), 125 female police officers have asserted claims for back pay and
retroactive seniority based on an alleged systematic pattern and practice of discrimina-
tion in assignment, transfer, and promotion against them from the early 1960s to the
present. Although these complainants were spared the rigors and dangers of police
work by performing largely matron duty, they now seek the promotions and
compensation retroactively of those who did perform police work.
It is noteworthy that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 prohibits employers from
"norming," or adjusting test scores for employment-related tests based on race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (Supp. III 1991). It is
possible that this provision may bring into question the differential physical standards
3
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standards and job criteria that can withstand a legal challenge under the ADA.
Without such standards, the law enforcement community cannot meet its
burden of proving why a disabled person, as defined by the ADA,9 should not
be hired, even if he or she cannot do the job that the general public expects.
The potential repercussions of the lack of court-validated and generally
accepted job standards and criteria is even greater for the general public than
for the law enforcement community. The potentially disastrous result for the
law enforcement community and the public at large is that public monies are
spent to hire individuals who clearly cannot perform the job that they were
hired to do. These individuals endanger themselves and the public that they
are hired to protect, but they cannot be rejected as unqualified applicants
because police job standards and criteria have not been court-validated or
otherwise generally accepted.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the impact of the ADA on law
enforcement employment. Critical to this analysis will be a review of the
ADA's historical antecedents. This will include an overview of federal
disability law prior to passage of the ADA, with particular emphasis on the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1" from which the ADA borrowed liberally."
Perhaps the major distinction between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of
for men and women tested for police work. However, it is also possible, until this
provision of the Act is litigated, that the "norming" prohibited is intended only for
written examinations and not physical fitness to do the job.
9. The ADA defines a disabled person as an individual with: "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (3) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment." If an individual meets one of these three tests, he or she is
considered to be an individual with a disability for purposes of coverage under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Act of July 26, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
331 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. III 1991); see also 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.104 (1993); 56 Fed. Reg. 35698 (1991).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
11. The liberal borrowing by the ADA from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is
openly acknowledged by the agencies responsible for implementation of the ADA.
Thus, the Department of Justice, in its regulations implementing Title II of the ADA,
states, "[m]ost programs and activities of State and local governments are recipients
of Federal financial assistance from one or more Federal funding agencies and,
therefore, are already covered by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended (29 U.S.C. 794) ("section 504") which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of handicap in federally assisted programs and activities. Because Title I of the.ADA
essentially extends the nondiscrimination mandate of section 504 to those State and
local governments that do not receive Federal financial assistance, this rule hews
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1973 is that the ADA applies to virtually all employers, 2 while the latter
applies only to federal contractors. 3 Review of the Rehabilitation Act is
necessary because there is no existing body of case law under the ADA which
may be analyzed, and the Rehabilitation Act has not yet been abrogated.
Therefore, the federal courts' interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act as
applied in the case law since 1973 will provide a significant clue as to how
the ADA will be applied and how its impact on law enforcement will be felt.
Many state laws have also provided protection against job discrimination
directed at the disabled. In the forefront of these protections is New York,
which preceded the ADA with its own laws and applied those laws very
vigorously on behalf of the disabled. This Article, therefore, shall also
analyze the application of the New York anti-discrimination law ("Human
Rights Law") 4 by the New York courts to the disabled to see what insights
it offers into how the ADA is likely to be applied nationally.
This Article will next address the essential provisions of the ADA, which
include: (1) who is a disabled but "otherwise qualified" individual entitled to
the protection of ADA? (2) what is a "reasonable accommodation" that can be
made to permit employment of a disabled individual "otherwise qualified?" (3)
what is "undue hardship" for an employer when measured against the
requirement of "reasonable accommodation?" (4) what are "essential functions
of ajob" under the ADA? (5) what are acts of discrimination under the ADA?
and (6) what is the status of pre-employment and post-employment medical
examinations and inquiries, physical and mental fitness tests, and physical
agility tests under the ADA?
Finally, this Article will address the issue and the status of job criteria,
including physical and mental standards, in law enforcement employment in
light of the ADA. The focus will be on whether law enforcement employers
can now or in the future base their job analyses and selection procedures on
job-relatedness and business necessity to perform the "essential functions" of
the job, as required by the ADA, and also make "reasonable accommodation,"
including restructuring of job requirements and workspace configurations,
when such can be made without "undue hardship." Since it is obvious that
law enforcement employers are in no position to flout the ADA, the issue is
12. Employers exempt from coverage are the federal government (except for
Congress) and its government-owned corporations, Indian tribes, bonafide tax exempt
private membership clubs, and religious organizations that require as part of their faith
that their employees be of their faith. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211 1(5)(B), 12113(C) (Supp.
III 1991). It is significant that federal law enforcement agencies such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are
exempt from ADA coverage.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1991); see also supra note 11.
14. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1993).
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how they are likely to adapt to it and whether such adaptation is in a manner
consistent with public safety and the national interest.
II. THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was intended as part of a national policy
against discrimination by federal contractors on the basis of a handicap. 5
Section 504 of the Act provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
as defined in Section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of
her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
16
Section 503 of the Act 7 defines a "handicapped individual" as "any
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 8
The phrase "is regarded as having such an impairment" is very broad and
can conceivably create a handicap discrimination case from a wholly
subjective evaluation by an employer that an applicant is unfit for mental or
physical reasons even if such applicant appears to be fit by objective
standards. However, such a broad interpretation has been narrowed by the
federal courts. In De La Torres v. Bolger,9 which could have application
to the ADA, the court stated that "[a]n impairment that interferes with an
individual's ability to do a particular job but does not significantly decrease
that individual's ability to obtain satisfactory employment otherwise" does not
15. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which addresses employment
discrimination, is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). The Act defines "handicap"
exactly as the ADA defined "disability" seventeen years later. Compare 29 U.S.C.
§ 701(8)(B) (Supp. III 1991) with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. III 1991). The word
"handicap" is now in political disfavor and so the word "disability" was substituted in
the ADA. Prior to passage of the Rehabilitation Act, the protections offered disabled
Americans were of a more piecemeal nature and were contained in the following
legislation: (a) the Social Security Act of 1935; (b) the La Follette-Barden Act of
1943; (c) the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954; (d) the Architectural
Barriers Act of 1968; and (e) the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. III 1991).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(b) (Supp. III 1991).
18. Id.
19. De La Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593, 596-97 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd,
781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986). See also, Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755
F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 58
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"substantially limit" that individual for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.20
The term "major life activities" under subsection 706(7) is defined as
"caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning and working.",21 The breadth of this definition,
coupled with that of the phrase "is regarded as having such an impairment,"
is so great as to encompass, and potentially make illegal, various medical
standards that would otherwise be used to reject employment applicants. For
example, an applicant for the New York City Police Department with poor
vision or hearing who had difficulty walking, speaking, breathing, learning or
working would have protection of the Act and could not be automatically
rejected as long as he claimed that he was "otherwise qualified." The burden
would then shift to the police department to prove that he was not "otherwise
qualified" and that the police hiring standards requiring the ability to perform
these "major life activities" measure the job skills for a police officer. In the
absence of court validation of such standards for police officers generally as
of this date, it is by no means certain that New York's or another city's police
department can meet that burden in litigation.
Since enactment, the only narrowing of the Rehabilitation Act by
amendment took place in 1978, so that the definition of "handicapped
individual" for employment purposes
does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug
abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such
individual from performing the duties of the job in question or
whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug
abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety
of others.Y
Thus, only a current alcohol or drug abuser is denied the protection of
handicap status in bringing an action against an employer or prospective
employer if such individual is otherwise physically or mentally impaired, or
regarded as such, so that his major life activities are substantially limited.
Section 503 of the Act, as provided through its implementing regulations,
mandates that physical job qualifications, to the extent that they "tend to
screen out qualified handicapped individuals," must be "related to the specific
jobs for which the individual is being considered and shall be consistent with
business necessity and the safe performance of the job."'
20. De La Torres, 610 F. Supp. at 596-97.
21. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1993).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1988).
23. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 (1993).
7
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The federal courts have adjudicated a number of the most significant
aspects of handicap discrimination, namely, "reasonable accommodation," the
risk of future injury, what constitutes a "handicap," and pre-employment
inquiries.
A. Reasonable Accommodation
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,' a case frequently cited
although it is not an employment case, the United States Supreme Court
decided how much "reasonable accommodation" had to be made for an
applicant for admission to nursing school who had a serious hearing loss. On
the basis of an audiologist's report, the Executive Director of the North
Carolina Board of Nursing found that Davis' hearing disability made it unsafe
for her to practice as a nurse or to participate in the school's normal clinical
training program.' The Court held that there was no violation of Section
504 of the Act in the school's refusal to admit her, explaining that she was not
the victim of handicap discrimination because she was not "otherwise
qualified" as defined by the statute.26 She was not "one who is able to meet
all of a program's requirements in spite of her handicap."" The Court found
that accommodations that would have been required for her hearing disability
would not be reasonable because they would have required the substantial
lowering of standards in the nursing program.28
Another early case involving "reasonable accommodation" was Simon v.
St. Louis County, Missouri,29 which is significant for its potential impact on
law enforcement under the ADA. The district court, following the line of
reasoning in Davis, refused to reinstate a police officer who had been
terminated after being paralyzed by a gunshot.3" Although the former officer
was handicapped, the district court held that he was not "otherwise qualified"
because he was prevented by his disability from performing nearly all of the
police department's physical requirements.3 The district court also found
that the accommodations necessary to reinstate the officer would have been
24. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
25. Id. at 401.
26. Id at 406-07.
27. Id. at 406.
28. Id at 413.
29. 497 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 656 F.2d 31
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982).
30. Id at 150-51.
31. Id at 151.
[Vol. 58
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substantial and, therefore, would not be reasonable.32 Thus, the police
department was discharged from any obligation to reinstate him.33
The court of appeals, however, overturned the district court's decision as
"too rigid. 34 In taking upon itself the role of deciding physical standards,
the court of appeals held that the physical requirements for a police officer
position "were not in fact necessary, or were not required of all officers."35
Therefore, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to
consider the "functions within the [plaintiff s] department he has the physical
abilities to perform" and "whether the accommodations necessary in order to
employ [plaintiff] as a commissioned police officer are unreasonable. 36
Therefore, the St. Louis Police Department had to find a place for the disabled
former police officer where he could perform without an unreasonable burden
on the department.
The Davis and Simon cases apply to handicap discrimination cases the
four-prong test enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green37 to
analyze claims of disparate treatment on the basis of race, religion, national
origin, and sex under Title VII. Under the four-prong test, the plaintiff must
prove the following four elements: (1) that she is a "handicapped person"
under the Act; (2) that she is "otherwise qualified" for the position sought; (3)
that she is being excluded from the position solely by reason of her handicap;
and (4) that the position exists as part of a program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance. 8
Second Circuit cases illustrate the way this test has been applied to
measure medical standards and the possibilities of "reasonable accommoda-
tion." In Doe v. New York University,39 a case reminiscent of Davis, the
Second Circuit addressed a case based on Section 504 in which a medical
student sought readmission to a medical school.40 The court held against the
student on the grounds that she failed to establish that, despite her handicap,
she was "otherwise qualified" for acceptance to medical school.41 The
student had an extensive history of mental impairment requiring hospitaliza-
32. Id
33. Id.
34. Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 656 F.2d 316, 320 (1981), cert. denied,455
U.S. 976 (1982).
35. Id. at 321.
36. Id
37. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1979).
38. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
39. 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1981).
40. Id at 765.
41. Id. at 779.
9
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tions. She had departed from medical school because of psychiatric problems.
To the court, these facts indicated that she suffered from substantial limitations
on major life activity, including the ability to handle stressful situations of the
type faced in the medical training environment.42 The court found that an
institution subject to the Rehabilitation Act is not required to disregard
disabilities of handicapped applicants, provided that "the handicap is relevant
to reasonable qualifications for acceptance," nor would the institution be
required to "make substantial modifications in its reasonable standards or
program to accommodate handicapped individuals."43 The case law indi-
cates, therefore, that: (a) a complainant under Section 504 must establish that
he or she is "otherwise qualified," and (b) the medical standard must be
"reasonable." Moreover, it is the plaintiffs "ultimate burden of showing by
a preponderance of the evidence that in spite of the handicap he is quali-
fied."44
In New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey,4 the Second
Circuit applied the four-prong McDonnell Douglas test and struck down the
plan of the New York City Board of Education to bar certain mentally
retarded children from school because they were carriers of serum hepatitis.
The court found that the Board's plan met the elements of a prima faie case
of discrimination against handicapped children who were within the protection
of the Act. Also, the Board had failed to make "at least some substantial
showing" that its plan was justified to rebut the prima facie case.46 Thus,
under Section 504 and the McDonnellDouglas test, once the complainant has
established 'a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the agency to provide
evidence that the handicap is relevant. If the agency can establish that its
medical standard is reasonable and substantially justified, then the ultimate
burden shifts back to the complainant, who must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that, in spite of the handicap, he is as qualified as others deemed
acceptable for admission or employment. Thus, the agency has the burden of
establishing a factual or medical nexus between the medical condition and the
job's duties.
The Fifth Circuit case of Prewitt v. United States Postal Service,47
which involved a physically handicapped individual who applied for a job as
a clerk/carrier with the U.S. Postal Service, reaffirmed the Second Circuit's
interpretation of Section 504. The court reversed a summary judgment
42. id
43. Id at 775.
44. Id at 776-77.
45. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649 (2d
Cir. 1979).
46. Id. at 650.
47. 662 F.2d 292 (former 5th Cir., Unit A, Nov. 1981).
[Vol. 58
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decision against the complainant and held that the Postal Service was required
to make reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee if the
complainant could prove that reasonable accommodation could be made.48
The court found that even if the plaintiff could not perform without reasonable
accommodation, he might be entitled to relief as a victim of "surmountable
barrier" handicap discrimination, that is, that the barrier of the handicap could
be overcome by the agency's reasonable accommodation.49 The court cited
the Second Circuit's Carey decision, stating:
Mhe test is whether a handicapped individual who meets all
employment criteria except for the challenged discriminatory
criterion "can perform the essential functions of the position in
question without endangering the health and safety of the
individuals or others." If the individual can so perform, he must
not be subjected to discrimination."
However, the courts have emphasized that only reasonable, and not
extraordinary, accommodation is to be expected under the Act.51 In the case
of Treadwell v. Alexander, 2 the Eleventh Circuit held against a retired Air
Force colonel, rated by the Veterans Administration as being 100 percent
disabled because of his two handicaps, a nervous condition and a heart
condition. 3 Colonel Treadwell argued that the Army Corps of Engineers
improperly denied him a position because of his physical handicap. 4 The
Army Corps argued that his weak physical condition would prevent Treadwell
from doing the arduous tasks of the job. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
Army that the physical criteria for the position were job-related and that
reasonable accommodation could not be made for Treadwell's handicap.
Similarly, in the case of Bey v. Bolger,6 the court held that a postal worker
who had hypertension was not "otherwise qualified" because he could not
perform essential Postal Service functions, a reasonable accommodation could
not be made for the light duties he requested, and the physical standards for
employment were job-related. 7
48. Id at 311.
49. Id. at 305, 309-10.
50. Id at 307 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 1613.702(f), .703).
51. Id. at 307-08.
52. Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 474 (11th Cir. 1983).
53. Id at 477.
54. Id. at 475.
55. Id at 478.
56. 540 F. Supp. 910, 927-28 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
57. Id. at 927-28.
11
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B. Risk of Future Injury
The risk of future injury as a factor in rejecting an applicant has also
been litigated under the Rehabilitation Act. In E.E. Black Ltd. v. Marshall,8
a case significant for police applicants with back problems, the federal district
court in Hawaii considered the risk of future injury for an apprentice carpenter
who was denied employment by a federal contractor on the basis of a pre-
employment physical examination. 9 The examination revealed a congenital
back anomaly characterized as a "partially sacralized transitional vertebra,"
which made the plaintiff a poor risk for the heavy labor, bending, twisting,
and lifting required of a carpenter's apprentice.' However, an orthopedist
found that the applicant's back condition did not currently prevent him from
performing the job.6
When the company still refused to employ him, he filed a complaint of
handicap discrimination with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP) 2 Although the OFCCP found the company to be in
violation of the Act, the administrative law judge found no violation on the
basis that the applicant was not handicapped under the Act because his
impairment did not affect his employment generally. 3 The district court,
however, found the applicant to be a qualified handicapped individual and
dismissed the argument that his back condition should disqualify him for
present employment because it was likely to render him disabled in the
future.' The court concluded that the question of current job performance
was "the only relevant inquiry in determining whether a rejected applicant is
a qualified handicapped individual."6"
The court further held that the only basis whereby a medical standard
based upon the risk of future injury could legitimately disqualify an "otherwise
qualified" handicapped individual would be that such standard was job-related
and "consistent with business necessity and the safe performance of the
job." The court stated that "[n]on-imminent risk of future injury may
possibly be a reason for rejecting an applicant, but it does not make an
otherwise capable person incapable."'67 The court then explained that "in
58. 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (D. Hawaii 1980).
59. Id. at 1091.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1091-92.
62. Id. at 1093.
63. Id. at 1093-94.
64. Id at 1103-04.
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some cases a job requirement that screens out qualified handicapped
individuals on the basis of possible future injury, could be both consistent with
business necessity and the safe performance of the job."68 However, the
court made clear that the employer would have the burden of proving that its
medical standard was job-related and that the rejection of the handicapped
applicant was consistent with business necessity and the safe performance of
the job. 9 In Black, the court found that the employer had not met that
burden."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Black reasoning to
overturn a medical disqualification by the city of Los Angeles in Bentivegna
v. Department of Labor." Bentivegna, a diabetic, was hired as a "building
repairer" through the city of Los Angeles' Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (CETA) program.72 As a condition of employment, applicants
had to pass a physical examination.73 Applicants with diabetes had to
demonstrate "control" by maintaining blood sugar test results consistently
below a certain level. 4 Bentivegna failed the exam because his blood sugar
level was too high. The basis for requiring the exam was that diabetics
were subject to progressive vascular and neurological problems and that too
high of a blood sugar level created a high risk of future injury. 6
In overturning the medical disqualification, the court held that "[a]ny
qualification based on the risk of future injury must be examined with special
care if the Rehabilitation Act is not to be circumvented easily, since almost all
handicapped persons are at greater risk from work-related injuries."" The
court determined that the city and the Department of Labor had the burden of
"proving that controlling blood sugar levels to the [city's] required level
contributes cognizably to personal health and safety" and that such a control
requirement was "related to the performance of the job and.., consistent with
business necessity."78 The court concluded that there was no clear elevated
risk of injury in hiring diabetics and that the city had not supplied "evidence
adequate to establish the direct connection between the particular job
68. Id at 1104.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).




76. Id. at 622.
77. Id at 622.
78. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(a) (1982)).
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qualifications applied and the considerations of business necessity and safe
performance that the Act requires."79
In Mantolete v. Bolger,8" the Ninth Circuit considered the case of the
employability of an epileptic applicant who had been denied a position with
the U.S. Postal Service based on her physical handicap.8 The court
determined that while ajob requirement may screen out qualified handicapped
individuals on the basis of possible future injury, "there must be a showing of
a reasonable probability of substantial harm."82 The court explained that it
is unacceptable to make such determinations "based merely on an employer's
subjective evaluation or, except in cases of a most apparent nature, merely on
medical reports."83 The employer, in order not to violate the Rehabilitation
Act, must make an effort to determine if reasonable accommodation can be
made to protect the applicant against a reasonable probability of substantial
injury."
In Arline v. School Board of Nassau County,85 the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the termination of a school teacher who had tuberculosis on the
ground that further findings were necessary to determine whether the risk of
infection precluded the teacher from being otherwise qualified for the job.8"
The tuberculosis disease was held to constitute a handicap within the meaning
of the Rehabilitation Act.7 The court pointed out that even if the risk of
infection precluded her from being qualified for her elementary school job, the
school board had an obligation to attempt "to make some reasonable
accommodation for her in that teaching position, in another position teaching
less susceptible individuals, or in some other kind of position in the school
system."'88 The court's ultimate decision was upheld in an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.89 In dicta, the Supreme Court went beyond
79. Id. at 623.
80. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
81. Id at 1417.
82. Id. at 1422.
83. Id.
84. Id at 1422, 1423.
85. 772 F.2d 759 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. granted in part, 475 U.S. 1118 (1986),
judgment aff'd and remanded, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
86. Id, at 765.
87. Id. at 764.
88. Id at 765.
89. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). See also Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 769 F.2d 532
(9th Cir. 1985), in which the Ninth Circuit overturned, on the basis of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, the denial of admission to a nursing school of an applicant solely because she
had Crohn's disease, an inflammatory bowel disease.
[Vol. 58
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consideration of tuberculosis and stated that employees infected with AIDS are
not necessarily unprotected under the Act."
In Chalk v. United States District Court,91 the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court and applied the Rehabilitation Act to a dispute over AIDS in the
workplace.92 This was the first federal appellate ruling applying the Act to
an AIDS-infected employee.93 The Ninth Circuit held that it was not
necessary to prove with absolute certainty that transmission of AIDS could not
occur from schoolroom or workplace contact in order to sustain a claim under
the Act.' Consequently, Chalk, a high school special education teacher, was
reinstated to a classroom teaching position after his physician certified him as
able to return to work.95
C. What Constitutes a "Handicap"
The threshold requirement to sue under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is
that the plaintiff be a "handicapped person" as defined by the Act.96 Thus, if
a person is not classified under the Act as handicapped, it does not matter how
qualified she is for the position sought or how arbitrary the employer's actions
are in disqualifying her. The following five cases, while by no means
exhaustive, illustrate how the federal courts have determined who is a
handicapped person and who is not.
In Jasany v. United States Postal Service,97 a case possibly significant
for police vision standards, the Sixth Circuit held that a postal worker who
had strabismus (crossed eyes) was not regarded as handicapped under the Act
because his impairment affected his ability to perform only a narrow range of
jobs within the post office.98 He was not qualified to perform the duties of
operating a mail sorting machine for which he was hired, and the mail sorting
90. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7.
91. 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 703.
93. The Ninth Circuit noted two Federal District Court decisions and one New
York lower court decision upholding the rights of AIDS victims. Id at 708. See
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F.Supp. 376 (C.D.Cal. 1987); Ray
v. School Dist. of De Soto County, 666 F.Supp. 1524 (M.D.Fla. 1987); District 27
Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S. 2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
94. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 707-09.
95. Id. at 703-04.
96. Id. at 705.
97. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir.1988).
98. Id at 1247-50.
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machine could not be modified to accommodate the postal worker's crossed
eyes condition."
In Stevens v. Stubbs,"° the district court stressed the inability to
perform in a case involving a civilian Army employee who suffered from an
undisclosed transitory illness that required him to take periodic sick leave.'0
The court held that he was not a qualified handicapped person under the
law. °2 The court found that he offered no evidence to show that he had a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more of his
major life activities.0 3 The court also found that he was unable to cope
with the pressures of his job.""4 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the
court reasoned, was a discrimination law designed to protect "qualified
handicapped persons," that is, those who can do their job in spite of their
handicap rather than individuals who cannot do their job because of their
handicap.0 5
In De La Torres v. Bolger"'6 the district court further defined handicap
and determined that a former probationary postal worker was not a "handi-
capped individual" under the Act by virtue of his left-handedness or by his
forced conversion to a right-handed carrier at the post office.0 7 The court
held that he enjoyed perfect health, had performed a wide variety of jobs
without apparent difficulty, and was not regarded by the Postal Service as
"substantially limited" or impaired."'
In Tinch v. Walters," the Sixth Circuit considered alcoholism and held
that a recovered alcoholic with an organic disability based on his prior overuse
of alcohol was an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" and not guilty
of willful misconduct which would disqualify him from Veteran's Administra-
tion educational benefits."0 The court held that the willful misconduct
disqualification was valid only for current primary alcoholism and not for
diseases that result from it."' The court proceeded to strike down the
99. Id at 1250-51.
100. 576 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
101. Id. at 1413-15.
102. Id at 1414.
103. Id
104. Id. at 1411, 1413-14.
105. Id. at 1415.
106. 610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985), affd, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986).
107. Id at 596.
108. Id. at 596-97.
109. 765 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Veteran's Administration regulation that denied benefits to recovered
alcoholics." 2
In Tudyman v. United Airlines,"' the district court addressed the
question of whether an overweight applicant for a male flight attendant
position, rejected for failure to meet the airline's weight guideline, had a cause
of action under the Rehabilitation Act."' The court held that the applicant
was not a "handicapped individual" within the meaning of the Act because he
had no physical impairment and was not substantially limited in a major life
activity." 5 The court also found that his weight resulted from his voluntary
bodybuilding, which resulted in a low percentage of body fat and high
percentage of muscle."' The court noted what it called the "Catch 22"
aspect of Section 504 of the Act: the plaintiff must first show that he or she
has some impairment that substantially limits a major activity, but at the same
time must show that he or she is not so handicapped as to be unable to
perform the job."7 The plaintiff in the instant case was found not to be
limited in his ability to work, but only in working in the specific job of his
choice."' Therefore, the court held that he was not a handicapped person
for purposes of the statute." 9 It was irrelevant for purposes of the Act that
the employer's medical justification for its weight standard was illogical and
arbitrary, because such actions per se are not prohibited by the Act.20
D. Pre-Employment Inquiries
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits not only discrimination in employment
against the handicapped, but pre-employment inquiries related to possible
handicaps as well.' The ADA contains the same prohibition."z In Doe
v. Syracuse School District,"2 a Rehabilitation Act case, the plaintiff
112. Id. at 600.
113. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
114. Id. at 740.
115. Id. at 746.
116. Id.
117. Id at 744.
118. Id. at 745.
119. Id at 746-47.
120. See also In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977) and
Jarrell v. Eastem Airlines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), where the court
held that a weight limitation policy by the company did not discriminate against
females in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
121. 45 C.F.R. §84.14(a) (1979).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d) (Supp. III 1991).
123. 508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
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complained that the Syracuse school district had made impermissible pre-
employment inquiries regarding whether he had experienced or had ever been
treated for any "migraine, neuralgia, nervous breakdown, or psychiatric
treatment."'24  He had answered the question in the affirmative.15
Subsequently he was examined by the school district physician who found him
to be physically and mentally qualified for the teaching position.2 6
However, his application for employment was rejected by the school
district.' 27
The plaintiff charged that the pre-employment inquiry constituted illegal
discrimination against the handicapped, and the court agreed.12 1 The court
cited the implementing regulations of Section 504, established in 1977 and
promulgated in 45 C.F.R. section 84.14, which provides that:
a recipient (of federal funds) may not conduct a pre-employment
medical examination or may not make pre-employment inquiries
of an applicant as to whether the applicant is a handicapped
person or as to the nature or severity of a handicap. A recipient
may, however, make pre-employment inquiry into an applicant's
ability to perform job-related functions. 129
The court found that the pre-employment inquiry was improper because
it was not a job-related inquiry and was prejudicial to a disabled person's
ability to find employment. 3 ' The plaintiff's history of treatment for mental
or emotional problems was held to be unrelated to his current ability or fitness
to teach.'' The court held that the pre-employment inquiry was precisely
the handicap discrimination that section 84.14 sought to eliminate.1 2
E. Summary of Standards Applied by the
Federal Courts in Section 504 Cases
The cases presented in this section illustrate that once the threshold
burden of proving that the plaintiff is handicapped under the Act is met, the
plaintiff may file a complaint of employment discrimination on the basis of
124. Id. at 334-35.
125. Id. at 335.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 336-37.
129. Id. at 336 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (1979)).
130. Doe, 508 F.Supp. at 337.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 336-37.
[Vol. 58
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medical standards that deny him or her employment. However, to succeed in
this cause of action, plaintiffs must establish that: (1) they are "otherwise
qualified" to do this particular job; (2) because their handicap they cannot
readily do other jobs for this employer or for employers generally; (3) they are
being excluded from the position solely because of their handicap; (4) the
employer in question receives federal financial assistance; and (5) "reasonable
accommodation" can be made by the employer for their handicap.'33 If the
handicapped employee or applicant can meet these criteria, the employer
cannot successfully defend on the basis of risk of future injury.14  To
succeed, the employer must show that the medical disqualification is based
upon business necessity, the current safe performance of the job, or, at least,
the reasonable probability of substantial harm."
III. THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Section 296 of the New York Executive Law, otherwise known as the
Human Rights Law, has even broader scope than the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 in defining what constitutes employment discrimination against the
handicapped or disabled. Section 296 states the following:
(1) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of the age,
race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability, or marital
status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or
to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions
or privileges of employment.
36
Disability is further defined in the statute as:
(21) The term "disability" means (a) a physical, mental or
medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological or
neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal
133. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(K)(1) (1993). See also Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements
in spite of his handicap. However, the Court made clear that this did not mean that
reasonable accommodations are not required. Id. at 412-413.
134. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).
135. Id.
136. N.Y. ExEc. LAW, § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 1993) (emphasis added). New
York City has its own law protecting the disabled from job discrimination; see N.Y.
COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 8, ch. 1 (1993).
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bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical
or laboratory diagnostic techniques or (b) a record of such an
impairment or (c) a condition regarded by others as such an
impairment, provided, however, that in all provisions of this
article dealing with employment, the term shall be limited to
disabilities which do not prevent the complainant from perform-
ing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or
occupation sought or held.
37
Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the Human Rights Law defines "disability"
broadly enough to .encompass "medical" impairments as well as physical or
mental impairments. In addition, to qualify as a disability, the condition may
manifest itself in one of two ways: (1) By preventing the exercise of a normal
bodily function, or (2) by being "demonstrable by medically accepted clinical
or laboratory diagnostic techniques."'38
A. Disability Standards and Reasonable Performance
Once the disability threshold has been met, the employer must assess a
disabled individual's ability to perform "in a reasonable manner the activities
involved in the job or occupation sought."'39 It is clearly insufficient for the
employer to defend against a handicap discrimination complaint by showing
that an employee's "physical impairment is somehow related to duties he must
perform in the position sought."'40 Nor is it sufficient for an employer "to
show that the impairment precludes the employee from performing the
required duties in a perfect manner."'.' The leading case in New York
supporting this interpretation of the Human Rights Law is Miller v. Ravitch.4 2
137. N.Y. EXEC. LAW, § 292(21) (McKinney 1993) (emphasis added).
138. IA
139. Miller v. Ravitch, 458 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 (N.Y. 1983), appeal afier remand,
515 N.Y.S.2d 518 (App. Div.1987). The so-called "individualized standard" to assess
the ability of a disabled individual went into effect in New York in 1979 (L.1979, Ch.
594, now N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292.21 (McKinney 1993)).
140. Miller, 458 N.E.2d at 1237.
141. IM
142. 458 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y. 1983). The New York Court of Appeals remanded
this case back to the supreme court for trial on the factual issue of whether Miller, the
plaintiff, could in fact reasonably perform apart from any possible impairment. The
supreme court (Kings County) reversed his demotion upon remand, but the appellate
division reversed the supreme court on appeal, thus supporting his demotion, because
he could not climb stairs, which was a principal requirement of the job to which he
wished to be promoted. Miller v. Ravitch, 515 N.Y.S.2d 518, appeal denied, 522
N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1987).
[Vol. 58
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In Miller v. Ravitch, the court of appeals interpreted the 1979 amendment
of the Human Rights Law to require the employer not only to show that the
condition impairs job performance, but to show that the employee or
prospective employee cannot perform in a reasonable manner. 43 It is no
longer sufficient for the employer to show that the medical standard in
question is related to the nature of the employment. There must be a direct
nexus between the disability and the inability to perform the job reason-
ably.'" Under the Miller holding, even a probationary employee employed
by the city of New York, who may be terminated without hearing and without
stated reasons, may still not be terminated for reasons prohibited under the
Human Rights Law. 4' Thus, the Human Rights Law has created a stringent
"individualized standard," which subjects all medical job standards to the test
of a demonstrable and unreasonable impairment of job performance in each
individual case. Under the prior unamended definition, there was no need for
an employer to establish that the complainant's impairment actually prevented
him from performing the job activities in a reasonable manner, so long as it
was related to the performance of those activities.'46
The New York courts have consistently upheld the State Division of
Human Rights in applying the "individualized standard" to the Human Rights
Law, at least where there has been no direct conflict with the New York State
Civil Service Law Section 50(4)(b).'47 That section specifically permits
disqualification of a candidate for employment "who is found to have a
physical or mental disability which renders him unfit for the performance of
the duties of the position... or which may reasonably be expected to render
him unfit to continue to perform the duties of such position."'48
Thus, in State Division of Human Rights v. Leroy Central School
District,49 the appellate division fully followed Miller in addressing the
issue of the school district's failure to employ for a school bus driver position
an applicant whose adrenal glands had been surgically removed, making it
necessary for her to take daily hormone medication. 5 ' The school district
showed that it relied upon the advice of its medical examiner in rejecting the
applicant.' However, the State Division of Human Rights produced
143. Miller, 458 N.E.2d at 1237.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1236-37. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 401 N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1980).
147. N.Y. Civ. SERv. L. § 50(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. 485 N.Y.S.2d 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
150. Id. at 908.
151. Id.
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countervailing medical testimony indicating that the complainant's disability
did not prevent her from performing the duties of a school bus driver in a
reasonable manner.'
The court, in finding for the plaintiff, held that "the District could not
ignore the 1979 amendment and refuse to hire the complainant simply because
her handicap might in theory affect her ability to perform the job, even though
it did not in fact do so."' The court noted how the legislature had
amended the Human Rights Law and substituted "for the prior, general
relatedness standard an individualized test."' 4  The regulation of the
Commissioner of Education, which barred employment as a school bus driver
of anyone who had any "physical or mental condition which might impede the
ability to operate a bus safely," was held to be invalid "insofar as that
regulation may be construed as conflicting with the Human Rights Law.' 155
The broad scope of the Human Rights Law, going even beyond Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, is illustrated by the New York Court
of Appeals decision in McDermott v. Xerox Corp.."6 This case, which
involves gross obesity, is New York's definitive view of overweight standards
as a job disqualifier. Xerox Corporation refused employment to the plaintiff
as a computer systems consultant because she was obese. 7 She was offered
the position on the condition that she pass a pre-employment medical
examination.' 8 During that physical examination, the examining physician
found that, since she was 5 feet 6 inches in height and weighed 249 pounds,
she was obese and medically "not acceptable" for employment 9 No other
medically disqualifying conditions were found in clinical or laboratory
findings."6
The plaintiff filed an employment discrimination complaint against Xerox
with the State Division of Human Rights, charging discrimination based on
her disability, in violation of the aforementioned Sections 296 and 292 of the
Human Rights Law.'6 ' Xerox's defense was based, in part, on its use for
employment criteria of tables, published in 1966 by an insurance company, of
152. Id. at 909.
153. Id.
154. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 401 N.E.2d 196
(N.Y. 1980).
155. Leroy School Dist., 485 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
156. 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985).
157. Id. at 695.
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"normal" weight ranges for given heights. 2 The plaintiff exceeded the
normal weight range for her height by approximately 100 pounds. 63 The
Xerox physician determined that because of plaintiffs "gross obesity," she
should not be hired because such a condition "posed a significant risk to short
and long term disability and life insurance programs administered" by
Xerox.'
The State Division of Human Rights found that the plaintiff had been
discriminated against because of a disability because she was able to
satisfactorily perform the job of a systems consultant.'65 After much
litigation, the court of appeals affirmed the finding of the State Division of
Human Rights and the appellate division. The court found that it did not
matter that her overweight condition was treatable or voluntary or was
"unrelated to any glandular or organic deficiency."'" The court of appeals
also dismissed Xerox's argument that her condition posed a statistical
likelihood that she would be impaired in the future, with a consequent adverse
impact on the company's disability and life insurance programs. 67 The
court found that the term "disability" was not limited to physical or mental
impairments, but included "medical" impairment.'
The court of appeals ruling in McDermott v. Xerox Corporation is in
accord with earlier rulings regarding the application of medical standards to
disqualify employees or job candidates.'69 These standards, whether
involving obesity or any other physical, mental, or medical condition, will not
be upheld in the New York courts unless it can be demonstrated that at the
time of employment disqualification the condition unreasonably impaired the
ability to perform the job. 7' Without demonstrating a nexus between the
employment duties and the condition in question, the medical standard used
to disqualify an applicant is in violation of the Human Rights Law.' 7' Of
course, a complainant must first show that this condition qualifies as a
handicap under the Human Rights Law. 7 1 For example, under Xerox, gross





165. Id. at 697.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 697-98.
168. Id. at 698.
169. Id at 699.
170. Id at 698.
171. Id.
172. N.Y. ExEc. L. § 292(21) (McKinney 1993).
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In Kelly v. Town of North Hempstead," the court ruled that it would
be unlawful discrimination against the handicapped to terminate a diabetic
clerk since the condition did not adversely affect her ability to perform her
duties or otherwise warrant dismissal from the position." The court
assumed that diabetes was a handicap condition under the law.'
Neither the State Division of Human Rights nor the New York courts
have upheld handicap discrimination claims, however, where the complainant
was clearly unable or unwilling to perform the duties of the job in a
reasonable manner. In Silk v. Huck Installation and Equipment Division,'76
both the New York State Division of Human Rights and the appellate division
saw fit to uphold the employer's dismissal of a secretary-clerk who suffered
from a condition diagnosed as cervical and lumbar strain where her physical
disability caused her to miss an unacceptably high number of days of work in
a job that required consistently good attendance.' In Vadney v. State
Human Rights Appeal Board,' the New York State Division of Human
Rights and the appellate division saw fit to uphold the termination of an
employee who had recovered from a heart attack but was still excessively
absent after returning to work.'79 They found that the employee had used
all of his sick leave upon returning to work and then had been advanced
additional sick leave, but was still unable to report to work on a regular
basis. 8
The broad scope of the Human Rights Law is best illustrated in two
relatively recent New York cases involving applicants for the New York City
Police Department. In State Division of Human Rights on the Complaint of
Granelle v. City of New York,' the court of appeals clarified what is meant
under the state Human Rights Law to perform the job in a "reasonable
manner." In that case, the police applicant had a physical condition that was
currently nondisabling but likely to be disabling in the future.' The
condition was spondylolisthesis, a potentially disabling back condition.'
The court held that the prediction as to his future disability was mere
173. 477 N.Y.S.2d 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
174. Id. at 396.
175. Id.
176. 486 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y..App. Div. 1985).
177. Id. at 406.
178. 462 N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
179. Id. at 312.
180. Id.
181. 510 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1987).
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speculation. 4 Citing the individualized standard set forth in Miller8' and
Westinghouse,'86 the court of appeals overturned the appellate division and
set aside statistical evidence that the applicant would suffer a future disabili-
ty."7 The individualized standard required the rejection of a police
applicant to be based upon a showing that the applicant cannot currently
perform or will not be able to perform in the imminent future.'
In Antonsen v. Ward,'89 another police applicant case, the court of
appeals strongly reaffirmed its Granelle holding. The court held that
statistical evidence suggesting as high as a fifty percent chance of recurrence
of Crohn's Disease, an incurable inflammatory bowel disease, was insufficient
as a basis for terminating a probationary police officer for lack of medical
fitness. Without additional evidence showing a likelihood that the recurrence
would prevent job performance, the termination could not be upheld."9 The
court found the New York City Police Department to be guilty of illegal job
discrimination against the disabled employee in violation of New York's
Human Rights Law.'
B. Summary of Disability Standards Applied by the
New York Courts in Human Rights Law Cases
Until Granelle and Antonsen, the New York State appeals courts did not
consider whether the risk of future disability, despite a current ability to
perform job duties, is a lawful ground for failure to hire under the Human
Rights Law, as amended. Now having considered this, the courts have
determined that an applicant or employee, who qualifies as disabled under the
law, cannot be disqualified from the police job unless it can be shown, with
particularity, exactly why the individual cannot do the job. Generalities and
statistical evidence will not suffice as a means of projecting future disability.
A particularized medical analysis and an individualized assessment must be
put forth to justify the disqualification of each individual. Since the Human
Rights Law was amended in 1979, it is no longer enough that a disability be
merely related to the job in question to disqualify someone. Nor is it
184. Id. at 802.
185. Miller v. Ravitch, 458 N.E.2d 558 (N.Y. 1983).
186. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 401 N.E. 2d 196
(N.Y. 1980).
187. State Div. of Human Rights on the Complaint of Granelle, 510 N.E.2d at
802.
188. Id.
189. 571 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. 1991).
190. Id. at 639.
191. Id. at 641.
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sufficient if the disability in question somewhat hinders job performance, as
long as it does "not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable
manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held.""n
IV. ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS OF THE ADA
An examination of the essential provisions of the ADA reveals how
closely it follows the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the New York Human
Rights Law.
A. Disabled But "Otherwise Qualified" Individual is
Protected by the ADA
A "qualified individual with a disability" is an individual who has a
condition serious enough to be considered disabled yet is still able to perform
the essential functions of the job that he or she holds or desires with or
without reasonable accommodation. 93 A person is deemed to have a
disability under the ADA if: (1) he or she has a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits a major life activity; (2) he or she has a record
of a substantially limiting impairment; or (3) he or she is regarded as having
a substantially limiting impairment."94 This is the identical language of
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. The following individuals are
automatically excluded from disabled status: Temporary, non-chronic
impairments of short duration such as broken limbs and passing illnesses;
current users of illegal drugs; sexual preference, gender identity or other
sexual disorders not resulting from physical impairments; or compulsive
gambling, kleptomania and pyromania.'95 Examples of otherwise qualified
individuals include former drug addicts, alcoholics, and persons with AIDS or
the AIDS virus, provided they are able to perform the essential functions of
the job.196
192. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 1993) (emphasis added).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991).
194. Id. at § 12102(2).
195. Id at § 12211.
196. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1993).
[Vol. 58
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/3
1993] THE ADA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT 895
B. Reasonable Accommodation
Under the ADA, an employer must make reasonable accommodations to
allow the disabled person to perform the job. 7 A reasonable accommoda-
tion is any change or adjustment to a job that permits a qualified applicant or
employee with a disability to perform the essential functions of the job.'98
The request for the reasonable accommodation must be initiated by the
employee or applicant rather than by the employer or it need not be grant-
ed.'" Examples of reasonable accommodation provided by the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in its interpretive
regulations for the ADA include, among others, job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedule, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification
of examinations, and training materials or policies to provide disabled
employees with qualified readers or interpreters.2" The examples of
reasonable accommodation promulgated by the EEOC generally go beyond
those considered to be required under the Rehabilitation Act.2°l
C. Undue Hardship
The ADA allows employers to justify failure to make "reasonable
accommodation" if it would impose "undue hardship," that is, present a
significant risk of substantial harm at the present time.2" The risk of harm
can be demonstrated by cost, difficulty, or how disruptive the accommodation
would be.2°3 The assessment of the risk of undue hardship must be objec-
tive and not speculative or remote.2" If an undue hardship can be demon-
strated, an applicant or employee with a disability must be given the
opportunity to lower the cost of the accommodation below the level of the
undue hardship." 5
197. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
198. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1993).
199. 56 Fed. Reg. 35748 (1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1993).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a) (Supp. III 1991).
201. See Section II, supra.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
203. Id. § 12111(10)(B).
204. 56 Fed. Reg. 357(52) (1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1993).
205. Id.
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D. Essential Functions of the Job
The "essential functions" are those basic job duties that an employee must
be able to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation."° Under
the ADA, an employer determines what are 'the "essential functions of the
job., 2°7 However, courts will evaluate this determination by considering
written descriptions of the job in collective bargaining agreements or otherwise
on record before advertising for or interviewing applicants.28 These written
descriptions must note the time spent on each function, the skills and
experience required for each function, and whether the job would exist at all
without the function.2'
E. Acts of Discrimination
Acts of discrimination are those directed against disabled applicants or
employees in recruitment, hiring, advertising, job application procedures, pay
or compensation in any form, job assignments, job qualifications, position
descriptions, promotions, leaves of absence, terminations, employment fringe
benefits, selection and financial support for training, meetings and conferences,
employer-sponsored social and recreational programs, and all other employ-
ment-related activities."'
V. LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT, STANDARDS,
AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE ADA
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the New York Human Rights Law, and
the case law applying the acts, provide guidance as to how the essential
provisions of the ADA will impact on law enforcement employment, job
criteria, and standards. One case directly involving police officers provides
a clue as to such impact. Under the Rehabilitation Act, the case of Simon v.
St. Louis County, Missouri' indicates the far reach of the Act to accommo-
date disabled individuals. In Simon, even a paralyzed police officer may be
"otherwise qualified" and any accommodations he required might be deemed




210. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (1993).
211. 656 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir. 1981).
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reasonable for the employer, since physical requirements for a police officer
"were not in fact necessary, or were not required of all officers." '2 12
Another case that involved a hearing-impaired bus driver offers a clue as
to how a similarly disabled police applicant might fare under the ADA. In
Strathic v. Department of Transportation,213 the Third Circuit overturned the
federal district court and held that a hearing requirement for a driver's license
for a hard of hearing bus driver should have allowed a reasonable accommo-
dation for him, thus allowing an otherwise qualified individual to keep his
job.2 14 The court cited the Rehabilitation Act and saw no problem with his
wearing a hearing aid.2"5
The Rehabilitation Act reaches a relatively small segment of employers
because its protection is limited to employees of federal employers, federal
contractors, and recipients of federal financial aid. As a general rule, state and
local police departments did not fall into these categories and so were not
affected by the Rehabilitation Act. While the ADA does not pre-empt the
Rehabilitation Act, it does provide vastly broader coverage to encompass
212. Id. at 321. But see Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hospital District No.
1, 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. Cir. 1990), affd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (court
upheld the discharge of a licensed practical nurse who refused to submit to an HIV
test, holding that the perception of him as HIV-infected did not matter since he refused
to submit to a test the same as other nurses in accordance with hospital policy);
Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1004 (1989) (court upheld the termination of a police officer who used marijuana
as not violative of the Rehabilitation Act since he was not otherwise qualified to
perform the job); Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (The court
upheld a police department medical standard that held ineligible a police officer
applicant because he had two or more dislocations of the same shoulder. The court
found no violation of the Rehabilitation Act since the medical standard was reasonable
and he could not prove that he was qualified. The court found that there was a good
chance that his shoulder could dislocate again under stress or otherwise during a chase
or arrest, thus endangering himself, fellow officers, and others. Moreover, he had
already had four or five dislocations of his right shoulder, and his own doctor thought
that there was a chance of recurrence. The police department could not accommodate
him because it "would interfere with the department's ability to shift manpower where
most needed."); Huff v. Israel, 573 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ga. 1983), vacated, 732 F.2d
943 (11th Cir. 1984) (court held that the Rehabilitation Act did not support the
disability discrimination complaint of a law enforcement employee convicted three
times for driving off-duty while intoxicated because it was not his alcoholism disability
that caused his dismissal but his inability to do the job as evidenced by his three
convictions).
213. 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
214. Id. at 234.
215. I.d at 229.
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virtually all law enforcement employers." 6 Although the impact of Simon
was limited to its facts, comparable cases brought under the ADA pose a
severe threat to law enforcement employers, and, ultimately, the public.
In Miller v. Ravitchl 7 the New York City Transit Authority had
terminated an employee's probationary appointment to a supervisory position
because a Transit Authority physician found that the employee was not
medically qualified due to a heart condition that prevented his "excessive stair
climbing."2 8 The court of appeals, noting the amended Human Rights Law,
however, ruled that the termination was improper even if it was assumed that
an employee's heart condition prevented him from fully performing the duties
of his supervisory position because he might still be able to perform in a
reasonable manner." 9
The Miller standard, based on criteria of performing the job in a
"reasonable" rather than a perfect manner, and an individualized assessment
of ability to perform rather than a generalized assessment of the applicant's
or employee's medical condition, has been followed in the leading cases in
New York,"0 but only sporadically in other jurisdictions.' Clearly, the
1
216. While the Rehabilitation Act applies to recipients of federal financial
assistance only, the ADA applies to employment, public services, transportation, and
public accommodations, regardless of whether federal funding is received. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111, 12131, 12141, 12181 (Supp. III 1991). Moreover, under the Rehabilitation
Act, the 11 th Amendment protects states that seek to invoke "sovereign immunity"
from § 504 lawsuits, while the ADA specifically abrogates such 11 th Amendment state
immunity from suits filed under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (Supp. III 1991).
217. Miller v. Ravitch, 458 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y. 1983), on remand, 515 N.Y.S.2d
518 (App. Div. 1987). See also supra note 56.
218. Miller, 458 N.E.2d at 1236.
219. Id. at 1237. The case was ultimately re-litigated on the issue of whether he
could perform with a heart condition, and the court found that he could not and so he
could be demoted. Miller v. Ravitch 515 N.Y.S.2d 518 (App. Div. 1987), appeal
denied, 516 N.E.2d 1223 (N.Y: 1987).
220. Antonsen v. Ward, 571 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. 1991); State Div. of Human
Rights on the Complaint of Granelle v. City of New York, 510 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y.
1987); but cf Caminiti v. New York City Transit Auth. Police Dept., 508 N.Y.S.2d
590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (appellate division held that a police officer was not
improperly discharged because of a disability when he could not be placed on patrol
duty, which is a police officer's most important function); John B. v. Village of
Rockville Centre, 495 N.Y.S.2d 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 496 N.E.2d 686
(N.Y. 1985) (appellate division upheld the police commissioner's denial of permanent
employee status to a probationary police officer who had received treatment for
alcoholism and appeared unable to deal with stressful situations); see also Serrapica
v. City of New York, 708 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 888 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.
1989); Smith v. Ortiz, 517 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Sup. Ct. 1987); LaMotta v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 560 N.Y.S.2d 346 (App. Div. 1990); O'Hare v. N.Y.C. Police Dept., 555
[Vol. 58
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ADA will have an impact even in New York with its existing and vigorously-
enforced Human Rights Law. The impact will be much more significant
among law enforcement employers in the rest of the country. Since the
protections for the disabled under New York law closely parallel those
provided under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the New York experience
offers insights into how the ADA will affect the law enforcement community
nationally. The New York City Police Department, in particular, having lost
litigation involving police applicants with spondylolisthesis (Granelle) and
Crohn's Disease (Antonsen), is now seriously considering the employment of
police applicants with HIV-infection, cancer, diabetes, vision problems, high
blood pressure, and prior drug addiction in order to avoid further costly and
prolonged litigation under the ADA and the State and City Human Rights
Laws.
Similar to the New York experience under its Human Rights Laws, the
law enforcement community nationally faces the very real prospect of being
N.Y.S.2d 753 (App. Div. 1990) (police officer with a disabling leg injury that would
never completely heal and would keep him from fully performing police officer duties
was held to be properly dismissed); Seitz v. Suffolk County Dept. of Civil Service,
536 N.Y.S.2d 536 (App. Div. 1989); Rice v. Schuyler County Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 528
N.Y.S.2d 944 (App. Div. 1988), appealdismissed,531 N.E.2d 297 (N.Y. 1988) (police
officer with a hearing problem who could not meet job-related hearing standards was
held to be properly dismissed); LaMarre v. Granville Cent. School, 484 N.Y.S.2d 236
(App. Div. 1984), appeal denied, 478 N.E.2d 209 (N.Y. 1985).
221. See, e.g., Coski v. City and County of Denver, 795 P.2d 1364 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1990) (quadriplegic police officer could not be accommodated sincethe necessary
job restructuring and work site modifications would endanger him, other police
officers, and the general public); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 586 A.2d 37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), cert. denied, 593
A.2d 668 (Md. 1991) (court held that a mentally handicapped police officer could not
be accommodated); In re Cahill, 585 A.2d 977 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
(alcoholic firefighter could not be accommodated since several rehabilitative attempts
had failed). But see Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. North Washington Fire
Protection Dist., 772 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1989) (en bane) (the employer had the burden to
show that no reasonable accommodation could be provided for firefighters with
correctable vision and knee injuries); Brown v. City of Portland, 722 P.2d 1282 (Or.
Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 730 P.2d 1250 (Or. 1986) (probationary police officer
with knee and vision problems whose knee became inflamed after heavy exertion was
still held to be capable of reasonably performing); Commonwealth of Pa. State Police
v. Commonwealth of Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 517 A.2d 1253 (Pa. 1986)
(probationary police officer with only one kidney could not be summarily rejected but
had to have his eligibility fully considered); and Packard v. Gordon, 537 A.2d 140 (Vt.
1987) (court held that a police officer with a hearing disability, correctable with a
hearing aid, could be a "qualified handicapped individual" under Vermont law who,
with "reasonable accommodation," could perform the "essential functions" of his job).
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forced to hire disabled people and past drug offenders who are in fact not
qualified for police employment and who actually endanger public safety.
While the concept of elimination of discrimination against the disabled is a
laudable goal, the ADA does not take account of the unique and special
concerns of law enforcement agencies. Neither the ADA nor the EEOC
interpretive regulations take cognizance of the need for police applicants not
to compromise the security and integrity of police work and to have the
physical strength to perform police work, particularly patrol duty.
Perhaps the foremost problem for law enforcement under the ADA is
that, even though a drug addict need not be employed, a drug abuser who
deems himself rehabilitated would have to first be hired conditionally as a
police officer, and then the police department would have the burden of
establishing that he was still abusing drugs in order to show that he was not
qualified.' If he was temporarily not abusing drugs, he could probably
222. Section 1630.3 of the EEOC interpretive guidelines for the ADA allows an
employer to bar "individuals currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs." 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,736 (1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a) (1993). A prohibition against drug-users
was upheld by the Supreme Court under Title VII, despite a disparate impact on blacks
and Hispanics. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); see also
Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1986); Tharpe v. City of Newark Police
Department, 619 A.2d 228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). Current drug abusers thus
have no job protection under New York state law or federal law; see N.Y. ExEc. L.,
§ 292.21 (McKinney 1993); N.Y. City Human Rights Law, ADMIN. CODE § 8-102.16;
see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(i) (Supp. III 1991) (as amended by § 512 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")); 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) (1988); 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.201 (1993). However, there is a striking void in both the law and the
interpretive guidelines on what constitutes the meaning of the word "currently." Thus,
an individual may claim that he is not currently using drugs but that he is a "qualified
individual with a disability" because he previously was a drug addict. A law
enforcement employer would then have the burden of proving that the said individual
was not a "qualified individual with a disability" either because he had been only a
casual drug user rather than an addict or that he was a current drug user as determined
by a drug test. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,752 (1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(c) (1992) (drug
testing permitted). The first prospect puts the law enforcement employer in the
untenable and ludicrous position of proving that a former drug user was only a casual
user, while the applicant himself seeks to demonstrate that he used illegal drugs
heavily enough to qualify as a drug addict. See Burka v. New York City Transit
Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (case indicates that casual drug users cannot
claim ADA protection as disabled persons from the legal consequences of their illegal
drug use); see also Porcello v. General Motors Corp., New York State Div. of Human
Rights, No. 3-E-D-85-103394 (January 18, 1990) (agency held that a "social or casual
user of drugs, whether the drug of choice is alcohol or marijuana or cocaine, is not
disabled within the meaning of the [New York State] Human Rights Law," although
an individual who has been addicted or is perceived to be or to have been addicted to
(Vol. 58
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pass a drug test and then he would have to be hired. Under the ADA, police
departments could be prohibited from considering an applicant's prior drug
use, and such a prohibition totally ignores the unacceptable risk to public
safety posed by hiring former drug addicts.'
Another concern created by the ADA is that conditional offers of
employment must be made to disabled persons before medical and psychologi-
cal tests can be administered. 4 Thus, even people who can be determined
drugs is covered under that law); Doe v. Roe, Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1989),
aft'd, 553 N.Y.S.2d 365 (App. Div. 1990). Such an exercise to force ajob applicant
to claim past drug addiction to qualify for ADA protection also raises Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination problems for such an applicant when the statute of
limitations may not have run for the claimed incidents of past heavy drug use. The
second prospect allows a law enforcement employer to test applicants for drugs to
determine current drug use. However, such tests can determine at best only whether
the applicant tested had used drugs shortly prior to the test. Thus, a current drug user,
claiming that he is rehabilitated or perceived by a prospective employer as a former
drug addict, who uses drugs periodically rather that daily, would be able to pass such
a test and become a police officer. It should be noted, though, that random drug
testing has been upheld for police officers in an organized crime unit. Matter of
Caruso v. Ward, 530 N.E.2d 850, 854 (N.Y. 1988). It has also been upheld for
corrections officers. Matter of Seelig v. Koeler, 556 N.E.2d 125, 126 (N.Y.), cert
denied 498 U.S. 847 (1990). See Matter of Barretto v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J.,
May 15, 1990 at 21, col. 3 (2d Dept. May 7, 1990) (N.Y. Supreme Court upheld the
discharge of a Transit Authority police detective for evading a drug test after an
automobile accident).
223. The ADA Compliance Guide, a monthly bulletin published about the ADA,
notes that the EEOC would allow possible disqualification of a reformed drug addict
on character rather than medical grounds. Even with ADA protection, a rehabilitated
drug addict may be rejected as an employee by a law enforcement agency if it can
show that prior illegal drug use would undermine the police officer's credibility as a
witness for the prosecution of a criminal case and was thereby inconsistent with
business necessity. However, even this argument is not foolproof. If the rehabilitated
drug addict can demonstrate that he performed as a police officer elsewhere subsequent
to his drug rehabilitation and prior to applying for a new police officer job, this
disqualification strategy will not work. ADA COMILLANCE GuIDE, April 1992, at 201
§ 8.7.
224. Section 1630.13(a) ofthe EEOC interpretive guidelines for the ADA "makes
clear that an employer cannot inquire as to whether an individual has a disability at the
pre-offer stage of the selection process." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,750 (1991); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.13(b) (1992). Moreover, "[ain employer is permitted to require post-offer
medi6al examinations before the employee actually starts working. The employer may
condition the offer of employment on the results of the examination, provided that all
entering employees in the same job category are subjected to such an examination,
regardless of disability, and that the confidentiality requirements specified in this part
are met." 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,751. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1993).
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from an in-person interview to be physically unfit for the job because of
illness or physical or psychological disability would have to be given
conditional offers of employment. The burden would shift to the law
enforcement agency to show by medical or psychological tests, after an offer
of conditional employment is made, that such individuals are not fit to do the
job and that "reasonable accommodation" cannot be made for them because
of "undue hardship" for the agency.' In fact, it is unclear what indicia or
criteria other than the very superficial will be used to make a conditional offer
of employment. The result is that large numbers of police applicants will
have to be processed at prohibitive financial cost only to be ultimately
disqualified. The burden on the police employer also greatly increases the
likelihood of litigation for the law enforcement community from those denied
employment after having received conditional offers. Such litigation would
cause paralysis in the law enforcement community, making it next to
impossible to hire police officers in a timely fashion to fulfill the pressing
public need for more police officers, especially in the financially-pressed large
urban and metropolitan areas. With current law enforcement practice, even
in New York under its Human Rights Laws, police departments have the
discretion to offer jobs only to those who first pass written, character, medical,
psychological, and physical agility examinations. 6
In a police department, the "essential functions" of the job are grounded
in the traits expected of a police officer: good character, as manifested, in
part, by the absence of a record of criminal arrests and drug use; physical
strength and agility including the ability to carry a weapon and make forcible
arrests; and psychological and emotional stability. It is difficult to see how
Psychological evaluations are similarly restricted to the post-offer state. Id.
225. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,730, 35,752.
226. In New York, the adaptation to the ADA has altered the police department's
medical and psychological examinations so that doctors are now examining physical
and mental fitness to do the job rather than disability per se. These "fitness"
examinations are still being administered at the pre-offer stage. A successful candidate
must still pass a written examination and a character investigation before he or she is
offered a position as a probationary police officer. Then, the applicant must complete
a very minimal physical agility requirement at the police academy to successfully
complete probation. Thus far, the New York adaptation to the ADA has not been
challenged in the courts. It remains to be seen whether other jurisdictions will emulate
New York's effort to adapt to the ADA and whether such adaptation will survive a
legal challenge. This information was obtained from interviews with Deborah L.
Zoland, Managing Attorney, Legal Bureau, New York City Police Department in New
York, New York (April 20, 1993), and Lt. Chris Sullivan, Research Analyst, Personnel
Bureau, New York City Police Department in New York, New York (April 21, 1993).
Both Ms. Zoland and Lt. Chris Sullivan are officials of the New York City Police
Department who are charged with the responsibility for implementing the ADA.
[Vol. 58
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a "reasonable accommodation" could be made with respect to these traits
without compromising basic public safety functions.
The ADA's definition of who qualifies as disabled also presents problems
for law enforcement agencies. Is a person with high blood pressure who can
perform the police job with regular medication a "qualified individual" under
the Act? First, it is hard to envision how a police department can hire those
who, while in pursuit of a criminal, must take time out to administer high
blood pressure medication. Second, it would appear that such an individual
is not "substantially limited" in performing the "major life activities" such as
is required for the protection of the ADA just because he or she has been
declared unsuitable to be a police officer. A person with high blood pressure
can still reasonably obtain other employment.
Similarly, is an individual with a back condition such as scoliosis or
spondylolisthesis protected under the Act? Depending upon the severity of the
condition, such an individual might be able to perform the major life activities
without substantial limitation and so not be protected. On the other hand, if
her condition is severe enough to make her a "qualified individual" under the
ADA's protection, then she would likely be disqualified because of inability
to perform the physical agility and strength requirements of the job. This
ambiguity created by the ADA's definition of a "qualified individual" has
significant implications for police departments, who can ill-afford to have
prolonged litigation whenever they reject a police applicant and yet cannot
hire those who are unable to perform the job adequately.
The promotional sequence of police recruits in law enforcement agencies
is to begin their careers with training in the police academy and then progress
to street work before desk jobs are allowed. This, of course, necessitates an
adequate degree of physical strength and physical agility on the part of all
applicants. It would be far from a reasonable accommodation to expect
disabled applicants, lacking physical strength or agility, or both, or any police
experience, to compensate for such shortcomings or to be given desk jobs at
the start of their police careers. Desk jobs are given to experienced police
officers or to those who become disabled while pursuing a criminal.
Moreover, nearly 80% of law enforcement agencies in the country are small
in size with no provision for specialized desk jobs; all officers are expected
to perform and be available for street duty. 7 And yet it remains a distinct
possibility under the ADA that desk jobs for disabled police applicants may
be considered a "reasonable accommodation."
The requirements of the ADA are complicated because the law enforce-
ment community, because of past challenges to its job criteria and physical
227. Draft letter from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to
EEOC, April 1990, in response to EEOC's publication of regulations governing the
implementation of the ADA, 2.
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and mental standards, especially with respect to alleged sex discrimination in
employment, cannot presently come forth with job standards and criteria that
can withstand a legal challenge under the ADA. Thus, the absence of court-
validated or generally accepted job standards and criteria in law enforcement
means that even the most obviously unfit and disabled police applicants could
not be ultimately disqualified with any certainty that such disqualification
would be upheld in court. This problem, while existing before the ADA
under the Rehabilitation Act and state and local law, is exacerbated greatly by
the ADA's sweeping application to all law enforcement agencies along with
all the attendant publicity it has generated. It has been estimated by experts
in the law enforcement field that the completion of a job task analysis to
measure frequency and criticality of each police function is still years away
from completion. 8  Until such an analysis is completed, police hiring
decisions can not be supported on the basis of present job requirements and
criteria.
The sequence of testing police candidates generally includes a written
examination followed by medical and psychological examinations and then a
character investigation. Under the ADA, all these examinations and
investigations must be job-related and consistent with business necessity. In
terms of the ADA, the passing of the written examination may be considered
tantamount to a conditional offer of employment after which medical,
psychological, and character evaluations may be used to determine whether the
other conditions of employment are met. While it appears that the ADA need
not alter this sequence, the larger question is whether any of these examina-
tions and investigations can survive an eventual court challenge as being job-
related or consistent with business necessity.
The focus of the ADA has been on making certain that medical
examinations are not used arbitrarily against the disabled to keep them out of
jobs that they are otherwise qualified to perform. 9 The irony of the ADA
is that while it may make certain that medical examinations are used
uniformly for all job applicants and not only the disabled, and that the criteria
used to exclude applicants as a result of such medical examinations are job-
228. The New York City Police Department has been in the forefront of efforts
to complete ajob task analysis in order to develop job standards and criteria that can
be quantified and validated as job-related through measurement of frequency and
criticality of each police function. Interviews with Deborah L. Zoland, Managing
Attorney of the Police Department's Legal Bureau, and Lt. Chris Sullivan, an
employment specialist with the Police Department's Personnel Bureau, the Police
Department's two leading officials in these efforts, conducted on April 13-16, 1993 at
police headquarters in New York City, indicate that the completion of such efforts is
at least three years away.
229. See §§ 1630.13(a) and 1630.13(b) in 56 Fed.Reg. 35,750 (1991); 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1630.13(a), 1630.13(b) (1992) (pre-employment examination or inquiry).
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related and consistent with business necessity, the ADA never considered
whether in fact there were validated job criteria and job standards available for
law enforcement agencies.
In effect, police physicians throughout the country are being called upon,
as a result of the ADA, to examine police applicants, both those ostensibly fit
and observably disabled, to determine whether they can perform the job
without a clear indication of what the job is. Even before the establishment
of validated job requirements and job criteria, police physicians are called
upon to make an individualized medical assessment of the police applicant and
his medical condition, evaluate the police function that the applicant is asked
to perform, and determine whether his medical condition enables him to
perform that function. The individualized assessment means that they cannot
disqualify the applicant merely because he has a medical, physical, or mental
impairment, but must determine whether such impairment prevents him from
performing in a reasonable manner the job activities required. Thus, the
police physician's job is no longer a medical screening per se but rather a
physical and mental screening for ability or inability to do the job of a police
officer.
The ADA has been termed a "nightmare for employers and a dream for
lawyers," 0 and nowhere is this impact more likely to prove true than in the
law enforcement field. Yet even in the absence of a job task analysis and
validation of job requirements there are certain things that law enforcement
employers may do under the ADA, namely: (a) provide drug testing; (b)
provide physical agility and physical fitness tests; and (c) question applicants
closely about their ability to do the job without mentioning any disability,
however obvious. While litigation will undoubtedly challenge the physical
agility and physical fitness tests as not proven to be job-related, there is no
reason to abolish such standards at this point. Such standards ought to be
upheld because the standards are being used in good faith until the job
analysis is completed. Also, the litigation challenging the standards is likely
to take as long as the job task analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impact of the ADA on law enforcement agencies represents a
challenge yet unmet, namely, how to reconcile job rights for the disabled with
proper law enforcement and public safety. There will be litigation against
police departments across the country, which will undoubtedly cost the
230. See Thomas H. Barnand, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Nightmare
for Employers and Dream For Lawyers?, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 229 (1990);
Lawrence Lonergan, Americans With Disabilities Act Guarantees Change, EMIRE
STATE REPORT, March 1993, at 43.
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taxpayer many millions of dollars. There will be individuals hired for police
departments who will be more of a danger to themselves and their fellow
officers than they are to criminals. Some drug users will undoubtedly be able
to pass themselves off as drug-free and gain access to police employment.
This will be the immediate impact of the ADA as awareness of the ADA
grows and as police employment as a career, in a recessionary climate,
becomes more attractive. With the completion of a job task analysis and the
establishment of validated job standards and job criteria, the disastrous impact
of the ADA on law enforcement will be somewhat alleviated in the long run.
However, even then, there will be an enormous cost for the medical testing
and processing of thousands of people who will ultimately be disqualified.
Clearly, this burden imposed on law enforcement agencies by the ADA is an
extensive one, considering that there was very little attention given to state and
local law enforcement when the ADA was passed while exemptions were
provided for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement
Administration. 31
231. See supra note 12. Since the Rehabilitation Act applied to state and local
governments which were recipients of federal financial aid while exempting the F.B.I.
and D.E.A., the passage of the ADA followed the same pattern with little public debate
about the rationality of such an arrangement.
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